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I
Background
The National Laboratories discussed here are the major research
laboratories sponsored by the United States Department of Energy
(DOE).' They include such laboratories as Brookhaven in New York;
Argonne in Illinois; Oak Ridge in Tennessee; Pacific Northwest Labo-
ratory in Washington; Los Alamos in New Mexico; Lawrence Berke-
ley Laboratory (LBL), just above the Berkeley campus; and several
others.2
These are large, multi-program research institutions that were
founded during or shortly after World War II.1 The Atomic Energy
Commission created such programs to conduct research on various
aspects of nuclear energy, for both military and peaceful applications.'
They typically have a staff of up to several thousand scientific profes-
sionals, along with supporting technical and administrative staff.
These laboratories are operated by contractors to the Depart-
ment of Energy, which are known as "management and operating"
(M&O) contractors. 5 About half of the M&O contractors are aca-
demic institutions, such as the University of California and the Uni-
versity of Chicago, and the other half are private corporations, such as
Martin Marietta.6
. There are, incidentally, several hundred other national research
laboratories, operated by the Departments of Defense, Agriculture,
HHS, and other federal agencies. Those laboratories are typically
smaller and are dedicated to specific scientific missions. They are typ-
ically Government-owned and Government-operated (GOGO) labo-
ratories,7 as opposed to Government-owned and contractor-operated
(GOCO) laboratories of DOE.8 They range from small agricultural
1. See generally 48 C.F.R. pt. 970 (1995).
2. Philip J. Hilts, Panel Seeks to Streamline Nuclear Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at
A20. See also Omer F. Brown, II, Energy Department Contractors and the Environment: A
More "Special Relationship," 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 86, 89 n.4 (1990).
3. The National Laboratories had their origins in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), which required the Atomic Energy Commission, the predecessor to DOE,
to own the facilities used to produce nuclear materials and to conduct research and devel-
opment. Id.
4. See 48 C.F.R. § 17.604 (1995). A good synopsis of the early history of the DOE
contracts can be found in C. S. Hiestand, Jr. & Mark J. Florsheim, The AEC Management
Contract Concept, 29 FED. B.J. 67 (1969).
5. See 48 C.F.R. pt. 970 (1995).
6. Brown, supra note 2, at 89 n.4.
7. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 45.302-2 (1995).
8. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 31.001, 31.109, 31.203, 37.204, 952.227-78 (1995).
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research stations to specialized military applications laboratories.
Although the intellectual property law policies and practices of those
laboratories are in some cases similar to those of the DOE laborato-
ries, their interactions with the private sector are fewer and smaller,
and will not be discussed further here.
One common result of the M&O contractual relationship utilized
by DOE is that the National Laboratories are relatively independent
institutions. Although the managers of these laboratories are ac-
countable both to their parent institutions and to the DOE, they are
allowed and indeed encouraged by the DOE to exercise considerable
discretion as to the direction and scope of the research programs that
they conduct.
This is a natural consequence of being charged by the Govern-
ment with the responsibility for providing expert advice and assistance
to the Government in determining the direction and scope of federally
funded Research and Development (R&D) programs. Consequently,
the National Laboratories are, for the most part, research institutions
that are run by scientists, for scientists, for the purpose of conducting
scientific research.
As such the National Laboratories are relatively unique in the
scientific world. While some of them remain heavily focused on na-
tional security issues related to nuclear weapons,9 they are not bur-
dened with the educational responsibilities of colleges and
universities, nor do they have the commercial motivations of the ma-
jor corporate R&D laboratories in the United States. With the de-
cline of the major corporate R&D labs in the United States due to
worldwide economic pressures, defenders of the National Laborato-
ries point to them as the last national resource available for con-
ducting "big science" and other basic research that may not be
appropriate for academic institutions or private corporations.
The National Laboratories initially were created to serve a na-
tional security purpose,1" and to this day a few of them, including Los
Alamos, remain largely dedicated to the defense programs of the
DOE. Nevertheless, all of the National Laboratories have in fact
been broadening the scope of their research programs for almost
three decades. The end of the cold war in the past few years has accel-
erated this trend.
9. Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. Kathleen
Parker, Nuclear Research in Future, For All Labs, DOE Official Says, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, Feb. 14, 1995, at B3.
10. See Hiestand & Florsheim, supra note 4.
In the past year the Galvin Commission, chartered by the Secre-
tary of Energy, has studied the National Laboratories with the goal of
making a recommendation as to their future missions.11 That report
was just recently released to the public. 2 Although critical of various
aspects of the management of the National Laboratories,' 3 the Com-
mission has concluded that the National Laboratories remain a na-
tional scientific resource that should be retained. 14
11. Report of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on Alternative Fu-
tures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories, Alternative Futures for the De-
partment of Energy National Laboratories (Feb. 1995) (on file with HASTINGS
COMMUNICATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL).
12. Hilts, supra note 2.
13. Ralph Vartabedian, Panel Calls for Cutbacks at Nuclear Lab; Weapons: Warhead
Design at Lawrence Livermore Facility Should be Moved to New Mexico, National Com-
mission Says. Energy Secretary Responds Favorably to Recommendation, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
2, 1995, at A3. "The long-anticipated report found that the Energy Department's network
of 10 major laboratories, which are engaged in everything from nuclear bombs to biological
research, are overstaffed and inefficiently managed." Id.
14. Joint Hearing on the Galvin Report: Alternative Futures for the DOE National
Laboratories Before the House Subcomm. on Basic Research and the House Subcomm. on
Energy and Environment of the House Comm. on Science, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 9, 1995
(prepared testimony of Robert W. Galvin, Chairman of the Task Force on Alternative
Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories):
The futures for the laboratories should and do derive from the past. They have
been and are: a National Security role, an Energy role that includes Environmen-
tal factors and related Science and Engineering, an Environmental Cleanup role,
a Science and Engineering role, an Economic role, though with de-emphasis on
general industrial competitiveness.
The primary National Security mission is to provide for a safe, secure and
reliable nuclear stockpile in the absence of explosive testing for nuclear weapons
and many other derivative and decommissioning factors.
The primary Energy mission is to pursue a research and technology develop-
ment agenda which enhances the long-term prospects for adequate energy sup-
plies and efficient end use technology which minimizes adverse environmental
impacts.
The Environmental Cleanup role represents a monumental task in dealing
with the radioactive and hazardous wastes at former nuclear weapons production
sites and laboratories. This task cannot be addressed in an affordable fashion
using today's technologies. The national laboratories have or can develop the
technology which is urgently needed for the cleanup mission.
The national laboratories must serve a broad Scientific and Engineering Mis-
sion which underpins the Department's above cited mission areas and certain dis-
crete areas such as high energy, nuclear and condensed matter physics.
The Economic Development role should be focused on those parts of the
economy and industries that fall within the basic mission areas. Any other gen-
eral benefit should be viewed as a derivative from the core missions. Develop-
ment of technology for private sector companies in other areas should not be a
prime mission.
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II
Intellectual Property Rights
While much of what is discussed below is applicable to all of the
DOE National Laboratories, it should be understood that the policies
and practices discussed are in particular those of the three National
Laboratories operated by the University of California (Los Alamos,
Livermore, and LBL), and that actual practices may vary slightly at
other DOE Laboratories. In particular, it is noted that the University
of California Laboratories each have extensive computing facilities
that have been characterized as state of the art super-computing facili-
ties for a number of years.15 Consequently, some focus will be placed
on the intellectual property policies and practices related to the pro-
curement, development, use, and dissemination of software and com-
puter science technologies at these National Laboratories.
The intellectual property rights issues of interest here are those
that arise in business transactions between the National Laboratories
and the private sector where scientific research is to be performed.
Such business transactions range from traditional procurement of
R&D by the National Laboratories,16 through cooperative R&D
projects,17 to the performance of sponsored research for paying
customers.18
These transactions may be categorized logically according to the
direction of money flow: from R&D or software simply purchased by
the National Laboratories, to no-cost cooperative procurement or Co-
operative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), to
sponsored research funded entirely by private companies and per-
formed by the National Laboratories. Also addressed will be the li-
censing of intellectual properties generated at the National
Laboratories. 9
15. Siegfried S. Hecker, Retargeting the Weapons Laboratories, ISSUES IN SCIENCE &
TECH., Mar. 22, 1994, at 44.
16. See, e.g., Contract between The United States of America and The Regents of the
University of California, Modification No. M205, Supplemental Agreement to Contract No.
W-7405-ENG-48 (LLNL), Article VIII-Procurement (on file with HASTINGS COMMUNI-
CATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter Contract].
17. 35 U.S.C. § 3710a (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. Contract, supra note 16, at Article III, cl. 4-Work for Others.
19. Id. at Article XII-Intellectual Property.
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R&D Subcontracting Policies
The National Laboratories have historically contracted out some
part of their R&D programs. R&D subcontracts are awarded to both
academic institutions and private companies, as appropriate. As a
general rule, the National Laboratories act as though they are exten-
sions of the federal government in this arena, at least with regard to
rights in patents. DOE policy in this area is driven by the Bayh-Dole
Act,2° which by its terms applies to R&D subcontracts funded by the
federal government.2
Small businesses and nonprofit institutions are allowed to retain
title to their inventions, while big businesses are required to assign
their patent rights to the government.22 The government retains a li-
cense in all patents retained or acquired by subcontractors,23 and gov-
ernment march-in rights exist.24 Additionally, there is a "substantial
United States manufacture" requirement.25
With regard to rights in copyrights and rights in data, there is no
similar express statutory policy. DOE policy is driven instead by the
more general provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,26 which
contains a provision favoring the dissemination of research results ob-
tained with DOE funding. 27 Consequently DOE requires its contrac-
tors and subcontractors to request permission before asserting
copyrights in works created with federal funds.28 Normally the sub-
contractor is required to acknowledge that the government shall have
unlimited rights to use and reproduce all data generated under a
subcontract.29
With cost-shared R&D procurement, there is somewhat greater
flexibility. Rights in data can be expanded to allow a subcontractor to
20. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6, 94 Stat. 3020 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 202
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 202(c)(4).
24. Id. § 203; see also 48 C.F.R. § 27.304-1(g).
25. Id. § 205.
26. Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2011 et seq.).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013, 2051, 2161-66, 5817.
28. See, e.g., Contract, supra note 16, at Article XII, CI. 7, § (e)-Copyrighted works
(other than scientific and technical articles).
29. Id. §§ 2051(d), 2161(b), 2166(b). DOE claims a responsibility to disseminate scien-
tific and technical information under these statutes.
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retain commercially valuable data.3" Commercial software purchased
by the National Laboratories, but not developed particularly for the
National Laboratories, is typically acquired under "limited rights"
provisions that are intended to acquire for the Laboratories only the
minimum rights required by the National Laboratory and the govern-
ment, while recognizing the vendors' legitimate interest in protecting
proprietary interests in their software.31
IV
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements are a rela-
tively new form of industrial partnership agreement that are being
used by the National Laboratories of DOE as well as other federal
agencies. They have been authorized by statute since about 1989.32
They are true cost-sharing projects.
CRADAs are essentially joint research projects. The projects are
defined such that they are of mutual interest to the DOE Laborato-
ries, to meet their institutional objectives, as well as to a private part-
ner.33 In practice, each project is divided into two sub-projects. The
National Laboratory performs one sub-project, usually with its own
staff, its own funds, and its own research facilities. The private sector
partner performs the other sub-project, also with its own staff and re-
search facilities. The results are exchanged, presumably to the benefit
of each party. The theory is that each party can leverage the results of
its own research with the results of the other party's research.
Although CRADA projects are generally structured as just
stated, that is, in terms of distinct sub-tasks, it is also possible to have
more integrated projects, including exchanges of personnel, facilities,
and equipment where appropriate.34 Intellectual property rights in
CRADAs are treated in a generally reciprocal manner. The private
partner retains title to its inventions, although the government obtains
30. Contract, supra note 16, Article XII, CI. 7-Rights in Data; see also 48 C.F.R.
§ 27.409(h).
31. Contract, supra note 16, Article XII, Cl. 7, § (h)-Rights in Restricted Computer
Software.
32. Pub. L. No. 101-189, Div. C., Title XXXI, Part C, § 3133(a), (b), 103 Stat. 1675
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(d)(1).
34. Id.
35. See Department of Energy (DOE) Modular Cooperative Research and Develop-
ment Agreement (CRADA) Articles VII-IX, XI-XXI (on file with HASTINGS COMMUNICA-
TION AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter CRADA].
a license to those inventions.36 Likewise, the National Laboratory re-
tains title to its CRADA inventions, with in most cases, a paid-up
nonexclusive license being granted in advance to the CRADA part-
ner.37 Jointly made inventions are generally jointly owned.38
The National Laboratory M&O contractors are allowed some lat-
itude in negotiating even more useful arrangements with their
CRADA partners. For example, at Los Alamos a CRADA partner is
ordinarily given, in addition to a paid up nonexclusive license to Los
Alamos inventions, a first option to negotiate an exclusive license to
those inventions. With respect to jointly made and owned inventions,
provision is usually made for mutual consent to, and sharing of reve-
nues from, any licensing of the invention to third parties.
For the most part, copyrights in software are treated much the
same as rights in patents.39 Software generated under CRADAs,
however, can be problematic. DOE policy is to retain a form of
march-in right with respect to software, despite the fact that there is
no statutory basis for retaining such rights.40 In view of widespread
complaints regarding this practice, DOE has in the past year or two
relented, and will now approve CRADA language that no longer re-
quires CRADA partners to acknowledge DOE march-in rights, or the
obligation to provide copies of source codes to DOE.
CRADAs enjoy special statutory protection with regard to data
generated under CRADAs4 1 This protection was enacted to meet
concerns regarding the impact of the Freedom of Information Act and
certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act on CRADA partners.
As enacted, the CRADA legislation allows technical information pro-
duced under CRADAs to be withheld from mandatory public disclo-
sure for up to five years from the date of generation. Technical
information must be properly marked to maintain this protection. 3
As a general observation, there is little or no downside to enter-
ing into a CRADA with one of the National Laboratories. This is
particularly true for those companies that are already engaged in
36. Id. at Article XV: Title to Inventions. DOE retains this right under 15 U.S.C.
§ 3710a(b)(2), (3), as well as 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
37. CRADA, supra note 35, at Article XV: Title to Inventions.
38. Id.
39. CRADA, supra note 35, at Article XIII: Copyrights.
40. Id. at pt. E. DOE accomplishes this by a provision requiring licensing to "a re-
sponsible applicant" after a period [not to exceed five years] when the material is "Pro-
tected CRADA Information" defined in Article VIII. Id. See also 48 C.F.R. § 27.304-1(g).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(7)(B).
43. See CRADA, supra note 35, at Article VIII: Obligations as to Protected CRADA
Information.
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R&D, and who would conduct the same R&D regardless of the exist-
ence of any CRADA opportunity. For those companies no additional
research funding need be budgeted.
Research programs that would be conducted without the partner-
ship of a National Laboratory can be identified as a CRADA project,
if a suitable National Laboratory team can be found that has comple-
mentary research interests and a program sponsor willing to approve
the CRADA. In such a situation the benefits of the National Labora-
tory's CRADA efforts are obtained at essentially no cost to the pri-
vate partner.
V
Sponsored Research and User Facility Agreements
The National Laboratories are able to accept private funding to
perform research for private companies and other entities. This is
normally done indirectly, through purchase order agreements entered
into with the DOE. Funding must be provided by a private sponsor in
advance. Funds are then transferred by DOE to the Laboratory.
If the sponsor pays the full cost of R&D, including all overhead
charges imposed by DOE, the sponsor can obtain title to patents and
copyrights arising from the R&D at the National Laboratory." The
usual rules apply-the government and its contractors retain a license
to use the intellectual properties for governmental purposes, and the
government retains march-in rights in the properties.45
Under User Facility Agreements, private companies can use des-
ignated National Laboratory facilities for experimental purposes.46
User facility agreements are entered into directly with the individual
Laboratory. Users may obtain services of a National Laboratory's
support and scientific staff as necessary. So long as all costs are paid,
users can mark technical data as proprietary and remove it from the
premises.47 Users retain title to their own inventions and copyright-
able works, and are given a nonexclusive, paid-up license in patenta-
44. See Contract, supra note 16, at Article XII, Cl. 1, § (q)-Rights Governed by
Other Agreements. See also 37 C.F.R. § 401.14.
45. 48 C.F.R. § 27.304-1(g); 37 C.F.R. § 401.6.
46. See Contract, supra note 16, at Article XII, Cl. 1, § (q)-Rights Governed by
Other Agreements. See also 37 C.F.R. 401.14.
47. See Contract, supra note 16, at Article XII, Cl. 1, § (q)-Rights Governed by
Other Agreements. See also Guidance for Funds-In Agreements, U.S. Dept. of Energy,
Albuquerque Operations Office, Mar. 1995 (on file with HASTINGS COMMUNICATIONS AND
ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL).
ble inventions or copyrightable works of the National Laboratory's
staff.48
VI
Licensing of Intellectual Properties
For R&D funded through ordinary federally funded programs,
the contract between the University of California and the DOE pro-
vides that the University can retain title to patents covering most in-
ventions developed at the National Laboratories.49 There are certain
exceptions relating to weapons-related inventions5° and to certain ar-
eas of technology in which DOE has entered into preexisting intellec-
tual property agreements with private companies or through
international treaties. 51 However, these exceptions apply to only a
small fraction of the inventions made at the National Laboratories.
As a condition to granting the right to retain title, the DOE re-
quires that the University return all revenues from its National Labo-
ratory licensing program to the National Laboratory, to support
additional research, education, and technology transfer activities.52
Thus the University does not profit directly from the licensing of Na-
tional Laboratory technologies.
Consequently, the National Laboratories have their own patent
and licensing operations. Some DOE policy requirements are im-
posed on these operations. For example, licensing opportunities must
generally be advertised.53 The Commerce Business Daily is one ad-
vertising medium. Also, licenses must contain United States prefer-
ence clauses, requiring substantial United States manufacture of
licensed products or other showings of benefit to the United States
economy.54
Furthermore, the government retains a license to use the intellec-
tual property, 55 and also retains march-in rights to ensure effective
utilization.5 6 Certain conflict of interest requirements are also im-
posed on the University and its employees in the licensing of DOE
funded technologies.57 The National Laboratories are able to offer
48. Id.
49. Id. at C. 1, § (b)(1).
50. Id. at CI. 1, § (b)(2).
51. Id. at CI. 1, § (b)(3)-(4).
52. Contract, supra note 16, at Article XII, cl. 11(I)(h).
53. Contract, supra note 16, at Article XII, cl. 11(I)(e).
54. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 205; CRADA, supra note 35, at Article XXII-U.S.
Competitiveness.
55. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.14.
56. See 48 C.F.R. § 27.304-1(g); 37 C.F.R. § 401.6.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(3)(A); 48 C.F.R. § 952.209-72.
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field-of-use licenses, development licenses, and various kinds of
technical support in connection with their licenses of patents and
copyrights. 8
Licensing of copyrights in software is characterized by a slightly
different governmental policy outlook than the licensing of patents.
While the Bayh-Dole Act addresses contractor rights in federally
funded patentable inventions,59 there is no comparable statute cover-
ing federally funded copyrightable works. Consequently, governmen-
tal policy in this area is affected by other factors.
For example, the statutory prohibition against copyrights in
works produced by governmental employees60 seems to impart a gen-
erally negative attitude toward the concept of copyrighting and licens-
ing software at the National Laboratories. The University of
California, for example, must request permission from the govern-
ment each time it wishes to assert a copyright in software produced at
the National Laboratories, and must certify that it has a concrete li-
censing opportunity in each case.61 While this has become more or
less a formality that is now routinely approved, it does reveal the gov-
ernment's differing views on different kinds of intellectual properties.
On the other hand, in other respects, the government seeks to
treat copyrights in a manner similar to patents. For example, the
DOE has created, as a matter of policy, a practice of retaining some-
thing akin to march-in rights with respect to software.6 2 Though there
is no statutory basis for doing so, as there is for patented inventions, it
is apparently the view of the government that the same considerations
exist, and that march-in rights are appropriate to protect the interests
of the government and the public.
In practice, however, there has been no situation in which those
march-in rights have been exercised by the government; and even in
the case of patents, the government's march-in rights have only been
exercised a handful of times in the past 40 years or so. Moreover,
DOE at least has in the past year or two shown a willingness to retreat
from its practice of routinely attempting to retain this right.
58. Contract, supra note 16, Article XII, cl. 11.
59. 35 U.S.C. § 202.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Compare Andrea Simon, Note, A Consti-
tutional Analysis of Copyrighted Government-Commissioned Work, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 425
(1984), finding that exempting government contractors from the copyright prohibition is
inconsistent with the justifications which otherwise support the broad ban of § 105 and
arguing to extend the prohibition to federal contractors by revising the section.
61. See, e.g., Contract supra note 16, at Article XII, Cl. 7, § (e)-Copyrighted works
(other than scientific and technical data).
62. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.

